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THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACTIONS

Statutes of limitations occasionally give unjustifiable advantage to
a malpracticing physician whose negligence is not discovered until
several years after the negligent act occurred. Where an injury is not
discoverable for many years,' an interpretation that the limitation
period runs from the date of the negligent act may cut off the
plaintiff's right to sue before he learns that he has an injury. Concomitantly, physicians may be immunized from liability for their
wrongful acts. This Comment will examine the New Mexico statute
of limitations for medical malpractice cases in the context of injuries
not discovered until several years after the physician's wrongful act.
The Medical Malpractice Act 2 enacted by the 1976 legislature
contains a three-year statute of limitations.' It applies only to claims
arising out of acts of malpractice which occur after February 27,
1976, the effective date of the Act. Because the prior statute of
limitations will continue to govern many actions not yet filed, this
Comment will first discuss the prior statute of limitations and some
of the cases interpreting it. The new statute of limitations will also be
considered, along with its possible constitutional effects.
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PRIOR TO THE MALPRACTICE ACT

Prior to adoption of the Medical Malpractice Act, malpractice
cases were subject to the three-year time limitation for personal
injury actions,4 which begins to run when the cause of action
"accrues." ' But the statute does not indicate when a cause
of action
1. The most common latent medical injury is a surgical instrument left in a patient's
body during surgery. The facts in Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308 (Mo.
1968),
illustrate this problem. The plaintiff had an operation on her lower back in
1951. She
suffered mild pain in her lower back after that operation. It was not until September
1962
when she again had surgery on her lower back, that the cause of the pain was discovered.
A
surgical instrument, a rubber dam, had been left in her back in the 1951 operation.
The
plaintiff had no means of discovering the injury and none of the several doctors
she had seen
from 1951 to 1962 had been able to discover the source of the pain.
2. Laws of N.M., 1976, Ch. 2.
3. Laws of N.M., 1976, Ch. 2, § 13.
4. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-8 (1953); see generally Roehl, The Law of Medical Malpractice
in New Mexico, 3 N.M. L. Rev. 294 (1973).
5. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-1 (1953) provides:
The following suits or actions may be brought within the time hereinafter
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accrues. Much malpractice case law is concerned with supplying a
definition for accrual of a cause of action.
In most tort actions determining when the cause of action accrues
is simple. The time of the defendant's wrongful act coincides with
the time of the plaintiff's injury. The plaintiff has immediate knowledge of both the wrongful act and the injury; therefore, the cause of
action accrues at this time. 6
In medical malpractice actions, however, the wrongful act may not
coincide with the plaintiff's discovery of injury. For example, consider the case in which a doctor negligently leaves a surgical instrument in the patient's body during an operation. The wrongful act
occurs at the time of the operation, but the patient has no way of
the
knowing that the instrument was left in him, and frequently
7 Even if
instrument will not cause him pain for considerable time.
the patient feels pain shortly after the wrongful act, he may have no
means of discovering that the cause of the pain is a foreign instrument
left in his body.8 The plaintiff may not sustain monetary damages
because of the wrongful act until the cause of the pain is discovered.
Thus, there are three distinct times when the cause of action could
be said to have accrued:" when the wrongful act occurred, when
the pain was first felt, or when the cause of the pain and, consequently, the wrongful act were discovered.
Courts have developed two basic rules for determining when a
cause of action accrues: the wrongful act rule and the discovery rule.
Under the wrongful act rule the cause of action accrues at the time
of the wrongful act or omission. Once considered the general rule, it
is now generally disfavored. 9 Under the discovery rule, the cause of
action does not accrue until the patient discovers or using reasonable
diligence should have discovered the injury.' 0 This rule is now follimited, respectively, after their causes accrue, and not afterwards, except
when otherwise specifically provided.
6. For a discussion of when a cause of action is considered to have accrued see Developments in the Law, Statutes of Limitations, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 1178, 1200-05 (1950) (hereinafter cited as Developments).
7. "Nature has a mysterious way at times of hiding mishaps in surgery, and cases are
legion where foreign objects . .. have been inadvertently left in a surgical wound and the
patient remained oblivious of it for years afterward." Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash.2d 660, 453
P.2d 631, 632 (1969).
8. See example cited in note 3, supra.
9. See generally Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224, 232
(1964); Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash.2d 660, 453 P.2d 631, 634 (1969); D. Harney, Medical
Malpractice at 267 (1973); Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 (1961); 1 D. Louisell & H. Williams,
Medical Malpractice, § 13.06 at 370 (1973); 15 Vand. L. Rev. 657 (1962); 21 DePaul L.
Rev. 234 (1971).
10. The first case to adopt the discovery rule was Haysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal.2d 302, 57
P.2d 908 (1936). For later cases see: Annot. 80 A.L.R.2d 368, § 7 (1961); 1 D. Louisell &
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lowed by a majority of jurisdictions.' 1
In 1963 the New Mexico Supreme Court decided Roybal v.
White, 1 2 adopting the wrongful act rule and rejecting the discovery
rule. The physician in Roybal left a sponge in his patient which was

not discovered until after the statute of limitations had run. In holding that the cause of action accrued at the time of the wrongful act,

the Court relied on authority which has since been discredited.
The Court considered the wrongful act rule the "general rule"
followed by the majority of other jurisdictions." 3 However, as discussed above,' ' the rule is no longer a majority position. The
Supreme Court of Idaho, one year after the Roybal decision, said,
"[T]he 'general rule' has little to recommend it. It is neither the
position of the majority of the jurisdictions nor is it firmly based on
considerations of reason or justice."' '
Roybal v. White also relied on a Washington case, Lindquist v.
Mullen," 6 which adopted the wrongful act rule rather than the discovery rule. The Lindquist decision was based in part on the Wash-

ington court's interpretation of legislative intent. Reexamining the
interpretation because of "constant intellectual bombardment"' 7 of

the rule, the Washington Supreme Court overruled Lindquist in Ruth
v. Dight' 8 and adopted the discovery rule.
The Supreme Court in Roybal also looked to the possible intent of
the New Mexico legislature. The legislature had specifically adopted
the discovery rule in actions based on fraud,'
but had not so provided in actions for personal injury."0 This evidenced an intent, the
court said, to reject the discovery rule for personal injury actions.
H. Williams, supra note 9, at § 13.07; Comment, Recent Developments in Wisconsin Medical Malpractice Laws, 1974 Wisc. L. Rev. 891; Comment, Foreign Object Discovery
and
Misdiagnosis-Is There a Difference?, 29 U. of Pitt. L. Rev. 341 (1967); Comment, Medical
Malpractice Statutes of Limitation: Uniform Extension of the Discovery Rule, 55 Iowa
L.
Rev. 486 (1969); 1970 Wisc. L. Rev. 915; 18 N.Y.L.F. 491 (1972).
11. Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tenn. 1974) lists twenty-nine (29) states
following the discovery rule, twenty-two (22) of them adopting the rule since 1961.
12. 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d 250 (1963), discussed in Roehl, supra note 4, at 306-09.
13. The Roybal court relied on the statement of the general rule in Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d
268 (1961).
14. See text accompanying notes 9, 11 supra.
15. Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224, 232 (1964).
16. 45 Wash.2d 675, 277 P.2d 728 (1954).
17. Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash.2d 660, 453 P.2d 631, 634 (1969).
18. 75 Wash.2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969).
19. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-7 (1953) states:
In actions for relief, on the ground of fraud or mistake, and in actions for
injuries to, or conversion of property, the cause of action shall not be deemed
to have accrued until the fraud, mistake, injury or conversion complained of,
shall have been discovered by the party aggrieved.
20. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-8 (1953).
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2
The Oregon Supreme Court in Vaughn v. Langmack 1 reasoned
similarly to determine Oregon legislative intent and also adopted the
wrongful act rule. However, the validity of this reasoning to determine legislative intent "is dependent upon the supposition that the
legislature, in adopting the discovery principle as to fraud, had in
decided
mind undiscovered malpractice as well and nevertheless
2 2 In Berry
it."
to
as
principle
against the adoption of the discovery
v. Branner2' the Oregon court rejected this supposition and overruled Vaughn.
The Roybal case also looked to a previous New Mexico decision,
Kilkenny v. Kenney, 2 4 to determine legislative intent. Kilkenny was
a wrongful death action, and the statute of limitations was held to
run from the date of the wrongful act. This decision was based on
language in the Wrongful Death Statute,2 s which the court interpreted as manifesting legislative intent that the cause of action
2
accrued at the time of the wrongful act. 6 Kilkenny is readily dispre-1976 statute because
the
tinguished from malpractice suits under
only to wrongful
applicable
it is based on specific statutory language
death suits.
Justice Noble in Roybal recognized the harshness of the wrongful
act rule2 but said adoption of the discovery rule is a legislative, not
a judicial function. However, the legislature had adopted neither the
wrongful act nor the discovery rule. The statute of limitations speaks
only in the terms of accrual of causes;2 8 determination of when the
cause "accrues" has been a judicial function. The judiciary determined that a cause of action accrues at the time of the wrongful
act. 2 9 Adoption of the discovery rule would no more have been

236 Or. 542, 390 P.2d 142 (1964).
Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996, 997-98 (1966).
245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996 (1966).
68 N.M. 266, 361 P.2d 149 (1961).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-20-1 (1953) provides:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or
default of another, although such death shall have been caused under such
circumstances as amount in law to a felony, and the act, or neglect, or default,
is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to
maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every
such case, the person who or the corporation which, would have been liable, if
death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured.
26. However, the legislature amended this statute after Kilkenny and provided that the
cause of action accrues as of the date of death. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-20-2 (Supp. 1975).
27. 72 N.M. at 287, 383 P.2d at 252.
28. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 23-1-1 (1953).
29. Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d 250 (1963).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
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judicial legislation than was adoption of the wrongful act rule. 3 0
The court in Roybal made no independent determination of when
a cause of action should be said to have accrued. Instead the court
relied on Kilkenny v. Kenney3" to hold that a cause of action for
malpractice accrues at the time of the wrongful act. Yet, a cause of
action does not accrue until a suit may be brought 3 2 and it is impossible to bring suit if neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has any
knowledge of the injury. 3" As a Washington Supreme Court justice
said:
To say that the patient had a cause of action all the while, although
no one knew about it or suspected it, may meet some tests of legal
logic or theory, but the result would hardly meet the tests of abstract, generally applicable, or lay standards of justice.3 4

Perhaps because of some of these problems the Roybal wrongful
act rule has not been applied to actions not based on medical malpractice. 3 In a malpractice action against an accountant, Chisholm
v. Scott,36 the Court of Appeals distinguished Roybal and adopted
the discovery rule for an accountant's malpractice. The court said:
the trust and confidence that the client places in the professional
person places him in a vulnerable position should that trust and
confidence be misplaced. It is the policy of the law to encourage
...

30. Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996, 999 (1966). Morgan v. Grace Hospital,
149 W.Va. 783, 144 S.E.2d 156, 160 (1965).
31. 68 N.M. 266, 361 P.2d 149 (1961). The questionable authority of Kilkenny has been
discussed. See text accompanying notes 24-26 supra.
32. Developments, supra note 6, at 1200-05 (1950).
33. In Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 421 P.2d 996, 998 (1966), the court stated:
(A cause of action) accrues whenever one person may sue another. Black's
Law Dictionary, 4th ed. ... To say that a cause of action accrues to a person
when she may maintain an action thereon and, at the same time, that it
accrues before she has or can reasonably be expected to have knowledge of
any wrong inflicted upon her is patently inconsistent and unrealistic. She
cannot maintain an action before she knows she has one. To say to one who
has been wronged, "You had a remedy, but before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law stripped you of your remedy," makes a mockery of the
law. Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149 P.2d 372, 375 (1944).
34. Dissent of Justice Finley in Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wash.2d 675, 277 P.2d 724, 728
(1954). Lindquist was overruled by Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash.2d 660, 453 P.2d 631 (1969).
(Emphasis in original). See also Frohs v. Greene, 253 Or. 1, 452 P.2d 564, 567 (1969) and
Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tenn. 1974):
We find it difficult to embrace a rule of law requiring that a plaintiff file suit
prior to knowledge of his injury or, phrasing it another way, requiring that he
sue to vindicate a non-existent wrong, at a time when injury is unknown and
unknowable.
35. E. 0. Spurlin v. Paul Brown Agency, Inc., 80 N.M. 306, 454 P.2d 963 (1969). The
Supreme Court held that a cause of action against an insurance agency accrues only when
the injury materialized, not when the wrongful act occurred.
36. 86 N.M. 707, 526 P.2d 1300 (Ct. App. 1974).
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that trust and confidence; likewise it is the duty of the law to
protect
the client from the negligent acts of the professional per3 7
son.

The policy of encouraging trust and confidence applies equally to
doctors as to accountants. In Chisholm the Court of Appeals may
have been laying a foundation for the reexamination of the wrongful
act rule in all situations of malpractice by professionals.
THE FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT EXCEPTION TO THE
WRONGFUL ACT RULE
3" the New
In Hardin v. Farris
Mexico Court of Appeals adopted
the fraudulent concealment exception to the wrongful act rule for
medical malpractice cases. The court did not consider the question of
whether the discovery rule should have been adopted3 9 but simply
assumed that the cause of action accrued at the time of the wrongful
act.
Under the exception stated in Hardin the statute of limitations is
tolled until the right of action is discovered or should have been
discovered when a defendant fraudulently conceals a cause of action
from the plaintiff. If a confidential relationship exists, as between
doctor and patient, fraudulent concealment occurs when the cause of
action is known to the injuring party but conceals itself from the
injured party. 4 0 If the defendant's conduct has prevented the plaintiff from bringing a cause of action within the statutory period,
under the doctrine the defendant is deemed estopped from asserting
the statute of limitations as a defense to the action.
Many jurisdictions 4 require the plaintiff to prove the defendant
knew of the negligent act and intended to prevent or hinder the
plaintiff from discovering the injury.4 2 Frequently, this places a
heavy burden on the plaintiff, since it is very difficult to prove that
the physician knew of the injury and deliberately did not tell the
37. 86 N.M. at 709, 526 P.2d at 1302.
38. 87 N.M. 143, 530 P.2d 407 (Ct. App. 1974).
39. The discovery rule was not briefed by either party. The sole issue presented to the
Court of Appeals was whether fraudulent concealment of the wrongful act would toll the
statute of limitations once the cause of action had accrued.
40. 87 N.M. at 146, 530 P.2d at 410.
41. See cases collected in Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368, § 10(c) (1961); 1 D. Louisell & H.
Williams, supra note 9, at § 13.11 at 380-381, n. 67, 68; Note, Malpracticeand the Statute
of Limitations, 32 Ind. L.J. 528, 537 (1957); Note, The Statute of Limitations in Actions
for Undiscovered Malpractice, 12 Wyo. L.J. 30, 32-33 (1957); D. Harney, supra note 9, at

§ 8.4.
42. This issue was not present in the Hardin case, since it arose on a judgment on the
pleadings in favor of the defendant. The court accepted the allegation that the defendant
had knowledge of the injury as true.
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patient. 4 3 But the fraudulent concealment exception has been
extended in some jurisdictions to be essentially equivalent to a discovery rule. Actual knowledge of the injury by the defendant is not
required if the defendant was negligent in not discovering the injury. 4 These jurisdictions note that a physician has a duty to discover injuries and to disclose them to the patient. Constructive fraud
is found when the physician fails to disclose facts which, in the
exercise of reasonable care, he should have known. Thus, the physician can be held to knowledge of his own malpractice, and his failure
to disclose is considered constructive fraud. The statute is tolled until
the physician discloses, or the patient discovers, the injury.
The Hardin case did not discuss whether the plaintiff would have
to prove willful concealment by the physician, since there were suffi43. A recent example of the problems a plaintiff has in proving fraudulent concealment
is Ray v. Scheibert, 484 S.W.2d 63 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972, appeal after remand). That case
involved an operation on the plaintiff's back after which the plaintiff became partially
paralyzed. The physician assured the plaintiff that the paralysis was due to muscle swelling
and that it was just a matter of time before it would end. After the one-year statute of
limitations had passed the plaintiff consulted another physician who indicated that the
paralysis was due to the surgery performed by the first physician. The Tennessee Court of
Appeals held that the statement concerning the cause of the paralysis did not amount to a
fraudulent concealment but was simply an honest mistake. Thus the statute of limitations
was not tolled.
44. Burton v. Tribble, 189 Ark. 58, 70 S.W.2d 503, 504 (1934):
.. [the doctor] performed the operation upon appellant and knew, or by the
exercise of ordinary care might have known, that the foreign substance was
left in her abdominal cavity.
The Arkansas statute of limitations was changed following the Burton case, Act 135 of
1935, but later cases have affirmed the Burton fraudulent (or negligent) concealment rule.
See Crossett Health Center v. Croswell, 221 Ark. 874, 256 S.W.2d 548 (1953), in which the
court held that the jury could properly find that the doctor's negligent failure to find a
foreign substance left in the patient amounted to a fraudulent concealment of the injury.
But see Williams v. Edmonson, 520 S.W.2d 260, 267 (Ark. 1975). In Morrison v. Acton, 68
Ariz. 27, 198 P.2d 590, 593 (1948), the court held that the conduct of the defendant was
sufficient to amount to a constructive fraud which tolled the statute of limitations. The
court held that there was no necessity of actual dishonesty or intent to deceive stating that:
The defendant knew, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have
known, that the instruments used by him had broken off during the operation,...
InSeitz v. Jones, 370 P.2d 300, 302 (Okla. 1962), the court said:
... [the complaint] states facts sufficient to infer that the fact [of injury]
was concealed by silence on the part of the defendant, though they knew or
should have known of her condition and their negligence. Whether intentionally concealed or not, the concealment would work to their benefit and they
owed a duty to investigate cause of pain and had they done so the needle
would have been discovered in the body of the plaintiff. It was defendants'
own wrong doings that prevented the plaintiff from knowing of her condition
caused by their negligence, therefore they should not be permitted to take
advantage of their own wrong by setting up the statute as a defense.
See also Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791 (Ky. 1952); Rosane v. Senger, 112 Colo. 363, 149
P.2d 372 (1944); Perrin v. Rodriguez, 153 So. 555 (La. App. 1934).
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cient allegations of fraudulent conduct in the complaint. However, in
order to avoid an unjust result because of the wrongful act rule, a
future court might extend Hardin to include cases of negligent concealment under a theory of constructive fraud. 4 Even if fraudulent
concealment were not so extended, allegations of fraudulent concealment may be sufficient to get the case to a jury in cases where the
statute of limitations might otherwise bar the action.4 6
It would be unfortunate if the doctrine of fraudulent concealment
were extended to include cases in which the defendant lacks actual
knowledge of his error. Constructive fraud is a fiction which distorts
fraudulent concealment to avoid the harsh results of the wrongful act
rule in malpractice cases. Avoidance of unjust results is better accomplished by adoption of the discovery rule, leaving fraudulent concealment as a useful doctrine in areas of tort law4 ' in which deceit is at
issue.
POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ACT
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

The statute of limitations contained in the recently enacted Medical Malpractice Act appears on its face to be an adoption of the
wrongful act rule.4" There is some indication, however, that the
legislature did not intend to adopt a strict wrongful act rule. The Act
Ind. App.
, 330 N.E.2d 336 (1975), the Indiana
45. In dicta in Toth v. Lenk,
Court of Appeals indicated its willingness to extend the doctrine of fraudulent concealment
to that of a constructive fraud in order to avoid the wrongful act rule adopted by statute in
Indiana.
46. Justice Harbison, in a concurring opinion in Teeters v. Currey, 518 S.W.2d 512, 518
(Tenn. 1974) in which Tennessee adopted the discovery rule, notes:
Practitioners in the field of malpractice are aware that claimants frequently
have added spurious "fraudulent concealment" allegations to complaints in
order to attempt to circumvent the statute of limitations, when there was no
basis in fact or law for charging the defendant with fraud. The adoption of the
"discovery" rule regarding the statute of limitations should tend to minimize
this practice and to protect reputable persons from reckless and indiscriminate
charges of dishonorable conduct.
This Comment does not propose incorporation of spurious allegations into all malpractice
complaints. The practice that has arisen in other jurisdictions where the discovery rule has
not been adopted is merely being illustrated.
47. See Southwestern Investment Co. v. Cactus Motor Co., 355 F.2d 674 (10th Cir.
1966). See also Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 Mich. L.
Rev. 875 (1933), fraudulent concealment has been used to toll statutes of limitations in
cases based on misappropriation of funds by an employee or trustee, trespass to land, secret
breach of contract, and fraudulent transfers of assets to avoid creditors.
48. Laws of N.M., 1976, Ch. 2, § 13 provides:
Limitations-No claim for malpractice arising out of an act of malpractice
which occurred subsequent to the effective date of the Medical Malpractice
Act may be brought against a health care provider unless filed within three
years after the date the act of malpractice occurred except that a minor under
the full age of six years shall have until his ninth birthday in which to file. This
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as originally introduced in the New Mexico House of Representatives
provided that the limitation period should start "from the date of
the alleged act, omission or neglect .... ,"'9 The Act as passed was
amended so the limitation period now runs from "the date that the
act of malpractice occurred." ' 0 The issue raised is determining on
which date the act of malpractice occurred. The Malpractice Act may
be read to define "malpractice" as a negligent act causing recognizable injury.'5
If neither the patient nor the doctor knows or
suspects that a wrongful act has occurred because no injury is discovered, an act of malpractice could be said not yet to have oc-

curred. A court could thus determine that an act of malpractice
occurs only when the resulting injury is sustained or discovered by

the patient. This seems a strained reading of the statute, yet one
court has suggested that to avoid injustice a statute which on its face
mandates a wrongful act rule may be interpreted as imposing a discovery rule.5 2
Usually an act of malpractice would be deemed to occur at the
time of the physician's wrongful act. But in cases in which the doctor-patient relationship is ongoing, there may be continuing acts of
malpractice recognizable under theories of continuing treatment or
negligence. Such situations may be interpreted in either of two ways:
(1) if the course of treatment is ongoing, each treatment could be
considered a separate wrongful act; or (2) if the patient continues
subsection applies to all persons regardless of minority or other legal disability.
There is also a tolling provision written into the Medical Malpractice Act:
Section 22. Tolling of Statute of Limitation-The running of the applicable
limitation period in a malpractice claim shall be tolled upon submission of the
case for the consideration of the panel and shall not commence to run again
until thirty days after the panel's final decision is entered in the permanent
files of the commission and a copy is served upon the claimant and his attorney by certified mail.
49. N.M. H. B. 29, 32d Legislature, 2d Sess. § 12 (1976).
50. Laws of N.M., 1976, Ch. 2, § 13.
51. In Section 3(C) of the Medical Malpractice Act "malpractice claim" is defined as:
any cause of action against a health care provider for medical treatment, lack
of medical treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of
health care which proximately results in injury to the patient, whether the
patient's claim or cause of action sounds in tort or contract, and includes but
is not limited to actions based on battery or wrongful death; (emphasis
added).
There is thus an inference in the Act that an act of malpractice includes an injury to the
patient. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed. (1968) defines malpractice in part as:
bad, wrong, or injudicious treatment of a patient, professionally and in respect
to the particular disease or injury, resulting in injury, unnecessary suffering, or.
death to the patient, and proceeding from ignorance, carelessness, want of
proper professional skill, disregard of established rules or principles, neglect, or
a malicious or criminal intent. (Emphasis added, citations omitted).
However, since a malpractice claim is comprised of both an act and an injury, Section 3(C)
may signify only that injury is an element of plaintiffs case.
52. Toth v. Lenk,
Ind. App.
,330 N.E.2d 336 (1975).
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under the doctor's care, the doctor's failure to discover the injury
could be considered a second negligent act.' '

Both theories acknowledge that the patient's trust in his doctor
may render the patient unable to discover the wrongful act unless the
doctor informs him of it.' ' If the patient relies on the advice of his

doctor, the incorrect advice itself is an act of malpractice.5s

The

physician has a duty to discover his mistakes and to inform the
patient, and omission to inform the patient of wrongful acts that
should have been discovered is an act of malpractice.5 6 As long as
the patient is under the physician's care the physician may discover
the wrongful act, and there is continuing negligence if he fails to
discover it. When the doctor-patient relationship terminates, the
physician no longer has the opportunity to discover his wrongful act.

The cause of action then accrues and the statute of limitations begins
to run. Both the continuous treatment theory and continuing negligence theory are of limited value when an operation is performed by
a specialist who rarely sees the patient after completion of the operation.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals has rejected the continuous
treatment or negligence theories as a means of determining when the
cause of action accrues in a medical malpractice action.5 ' This decision may be reexamined in light of the new statutory language referring to the time when an act of malpractice occurs rather than when
a cause of action accrues used in the old statute of limitations.
POSSIBLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS WITH THE
NEW STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
If the new statute of limitations is construed to impose the wrongful act rule, the only remedy remaining to persons whose causes of
53. The continuous treatment theory and the continuing negligence theory are discussed
in Annot., 80 A.L.R.2d 368 § 6 (1961); 1 D. Louisell & H. Williams, supra note 9, at
§ 13.08, § 13.09; D. Harney, supra note 9, at § 8.3; Lillich, The Malpractice Statute of
Limitations in New York and Other Jurisdictions,47 Cornell L.Q. 339, 361 (1962); Sacks,
Statutes of Limitations and Undiscovered Malpractice, 16 Clev. Mar. L. Rev. 65, 67 (1967);
Note, Medical Malpractice: A Survey of Statutes of Limitation, 3 Suffolk L. Rev. 597, 611
(1969).
54. Swang v. Hauser, 288 Minn. 306, 180 N.W.2d 187 (1970).
55. Johnson v. Caldwell, 371 Mich. 368, 123 N.W.2d 785 (1963).
56. Note the similarity between the continuing negligence theory and the constructive
fraud extension of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment discussed in note 47 supra.
57. Mantz v. Follingstad, 84 N.M. 473, 505 P.2d 68 (Ct. App. 1973). There are, however,
other New Mexico cases which indicate approval of these theories. In E. 0. Spurlin v. Paul
Brown Agency, Inc., 80 N.M. 306, 454 P.2d 936 (1969), the Supreme Court used a continuing negligence theory in holding that a cause of action accrued against an insurance agency
when injury was sustained. In Roybal v. White, 72 N.M. 285, 383 P.2d 250 (1963), the
Supreme Court did not reject the continuous treatment or continuing negligence theories
but distinguished cases relying on them, since there was no allegation of continuous treatment in those cases.
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action against malpracticing physicians are barred because discovered
after the statute has run is attacking the statute on constitutional
grounds.
Due Process Challenge
Statutes of limitation are not generally deemed to deny substantive rights to a cause of action, but rather are considered procedural
measures to prohibit an action being brought to court too long after
it accrued. There is no violation of due process, therefore, as long as
the statute allows a reasonable time in which the action may be
brought.' 8 However, the statute of limitations in the medical malpractice situation may be more than a procedural bar. In cases of
undiscovered malpractice it affects substantive rights, since it precludes an opportunity to bring suit for redress of injury. In practical
terms the cause of action cannot be said to accrue until the patient
discovers or should have discovered the injury, yet the statute may
bar bringing the action before it was discovered. For such plaintiffs,
the statute denies completely access to the courts.
Justice McBride in his concurring opinion in Ayers v. Morgans9
asserted that the Pennsylvanian Constitution prohibited the denial of
access to the courts by the statute of limitations in a malpractice
case. Article I, Section II of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides:
All courts shall be open; and every man for an injury done him in
his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due
course of law...
There may be a similar access to courts provision implied in the New
Mexico Constitution.
Section Four of the Kearny Code Bill of Rights provides:
The courts of justice shall be open to every person; just remedy
given for every injury to person or property, and that right and
justice shall be administered without sale, denial, or delay, and that
no private 6 property
shall be taken for public use without just com0
pensation.
This provision was not specifically included in the Bill of Rights of
the New Mexico Constitution; however, it may have been incorporated into the New Mexico Constitution through other clauses in the

58. See Developments, supra note 6, at 1186-88.
59. 397 Pa. 282, 154 A.2d 788, 794-795 (1959).
60. Brigadier General Stephen W. Kearny with a force of about 1700 men made a
bloodless conquest of New Mexico and on August 18, 1846, put the city of Santa Fe and
the territory of New Mexico under the military control of the United States. General
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Bill of Rights. 6 ' Even without this provision, denying access to the
courts may be prohibited by the due process clause. 6 2
Equal ProtectionChallenge
The new statute of limitations operates as a grant of immunity to
physicians for certain types of negligence. If the, wrongdoing is such
that it remains undiscovered for some years, as in negligent surgery,
the physician is completely protected from having to account for his
negligence. The statute thus.creates a class of tort plaintiffs who may
never recover for their injuries simply because of the type of their
injuries: those whose injuries remain undiscovered for three years.
There is also the broader classification of tort-plaintiffs in medical
malpractice actions as compared with tort-plaintiffs in other professional malpractice actions6 3 and the class of physicians who as a
class receive the benefit, of special legislation which other professional persons do not receive. 6 4
In McGeehan v. Bunch 6 1 the New Mexico Supreme Court held
that New Mexico's guest statute 6 6 violated the equal protection
Kearney on September 22, 1846, published a Code of Laws to govern the citizens of New
Mexico which is now known as the Kearny Code. H. Bancroft, History of Arizona and New
Mexico 410-426 (1889, Republished 1962). The Kearny Code along with its Bill of Rights is
printed in Volume 1 of the New Mexico Statutes Annotated at 64-126 (N.M. Stat. Ann.
Repl. Vol. 1, 1969).
61. N.M. Const. art. 2, § 4 provides:
All persons are born, equally free, and have certain natural, inherent and inalienable rights, among which are the rights of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and seeking and obtaining safety and happiness.
A tort action may be considered a property right under this provision. Trujillo v. Prince, 42
N.M. 337, 78 P.2d 145 (1938).
N.M. Const. art. 2, § 23 provides:
The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed
to deny, impair or disparage others retained by the people.
Rights the people had under the Kearny Code Bill of Rights could be considered to be
retained by the people even though they are not enumerated in the Constitution. Also, the
Kearny Code Bill of Rights did not contain any express due process or equal protection
clauses. Therefore, section four of the Kearny Code Bill of Rights may have been incorporated through these clauses in N.M. Const. art. 2, § 18 by the members of the Constitutional Convention.
62. See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). But see United States v. Kras,
409 U.S. 434 (1973). See also Developments, supra note 6, at 1190-92 (1950). Note the
conflicting views on due process between Judge Garrard writing for the majority in Toth v.
, 330 N.E.2d 336 (1975), and the concurring opinion of Judge
Lenk,
Ind. App.
Hoffman.
63. See Chisholm v. Scott, 86 N.M. 707, 526 P.2d 1300 (Ct. App. 1974) (malpractice
action against accountant accrues at time of discovery of injury).
64. There may be a violation of the ban of special legislation or immunity contained in
-N.M. Const. art. 4, § 24 and § 26.
65. 88 N.M. 308, 540 P.2d 238 (1975).
66. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 64-24-1 (Repl. Vol. 9, Pt. 2, 1972).
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clause. The court followed the test enunciated in Reed v. Reed 6
that:

7

A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. 6 8
Statutes of limitations have two basic objectives: (1) preventing
revival of stale claims where "evidence has been lost, memories have
faded, and witnesses have disappeared, ' 6 9 and (2) acting as statutes
of repose by creating a time when "one is freed from the fears and
burdens of threatened litigation." 7
The first objective does not
support the classification that the malpractice legislation creates. In
an undiscovered malpractice case the possibility of lost evidence or
witnesses is not a major detriment. Laches-like notions of equitable
estoppel are not persuasive when the delay has not been plaintiff's
fault. And the existence of a foreign instrument in the plaintiff's
body may establish negligence per se.
The second objective, however, does serve a reasonable purpose.
Society benefits if there is a time at which ancient obligations and
rights are finally terminated. But the protection offered by such
termination is more easily justified when the plaintiff has allowed the
claim to slumber.
Besides the objectives common to most statutes of limitations, the
medical malpractice statute also responds to the recent increase in
medical malpractice claims and insurance rates. 7 ' The discovery rule
in statutes of limitations has frequently been blamed for increased
malpractice litigation. 7 2 Yet, California data compiled in 1970 show
67. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
68. 404 U.S. at 76.
69. Order of R. R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349
(1944).
70. Ruth v. Dight, 75 Wash.2d 660, 453 P.2d 631, 632 (1969).
71. N.M. H. B. 29, 32d Legislature, 2d Sess. § 2 (1976) provided:
Purpose of Act.-The legislature of the state of New Mexico, in recognition
of the fact that medical liability insurance premiums have increased substantially, causing the procurement of needed medical services to become critically
expensive in this state, enacts the Medical Malpractice Act. The purpose of the
Medical Malpractice Act is to promote the health and welfare of the people ef
New Mexico by placing certain restrictions on medical malpractice actions
initiated in the courts of this state, in the hope that such restrictions shall have
the salutary effect of reducing medical liability insurance premiums to practitioners and consequently to assure the continued reasonable availability of
necessary medical services in the state of New Mexico.
72. Comment, A Four Year Statute of Limitationsfor Medical Malpractice Cases: Will
Plaintiff's Case be Barred? 2 Pac. L.J. 663, 668 (197 1);MalpracticeFever-A Social Disease,
61 J. Fla. Medical Ass'n. (Dec. 1974); Dep't of Health, Education & Welfare, Medical
Malpractice, Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice (1973).
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that changing California's discovery rule to a wrongful act rule would
73
bar only about 10 per cent of California malpractice claims.
More importantly for the equal protection claim, the wrongful act
rule disproportionately places the burden of reducing total malpractice claims on one class of plaintiffs: those whose injuries are discovered late. As for guest passengers, victims of late-discovered
malpractice injuries seem insufficiently different from other malpractice victims to justify barring their recovery.
These constitutional issues arise only if the medical malpractice
statute of limitations is construed as imposing a wrongful act rule.
Construing the statute to provide a discovery rule would avoid any
constitutional infirmity.7"
CONCLUSION
Two statute of limitations problems will arise in New Mexico
malpractice cases. For those cases in which the act of malpractice
occurred prior to the effective date of the malpractice statute, the
prior statute of limitations must be interpreted in light of the discredited Roybal rule. The discovery rule should be adopted to govern
these cases. Yet, New Mexico courts may be reluctant to adopt the
discovery rule if they find a contrary legislative intent in the new
statute. For those cases arising under the new statute, courts must
determine when an "act of malpractice" occurs. The wrongful act
rule's harsh results and its possible constitutional deficiencies could
be avoided by judicial construction that the act comprehends a disthe legislature should
covery rule. Failing such a construction, 7
expressly adopt the discovery rule.
RON HORN
73. See Comment, supra note 72, at 668 (1971).
74. Of course the equal protection problems with the Medical Malpractice Act as a whole
would still remain. In two of the states that have adopted similar malpractice acts, trial
courts have found that they violated equal protection: Pollard v. Hendry County Hospital
Authority, Fla., Hendry Co. Cir. Ct., No. 75-11; Wright v. Central Dupage Hospital, Ill.,
Cook Co. Cir. Ct., No. 75 L 21088. Both cases are reported in 19 A.T.L.A. Newsletter 18,
February, 1976.
75. In a 4-3 decision, the Missouri Supreme Court held that it could not adopt the
discovery rule where the legislature had provided that the limitation period commenced
"from the date of the act of neglect complained of." Laughlin v. Forgrave, 432 S.W.2d 308,
314 (Mo. 1968). After noting that the plaintiff could not have discovered the injury prior to
the running of the statute of limitations, the court stated:
This argument is appealing and has some force, so far as justice is concerned;
in that respect the conclusion we reach is distasteful to us. But, the legislative
branch of the government has determined the policy of the state and clearly
fixed the time when the limitation period begins to run against actions for
malpractice. This argument addressed to the court properly should be addressed to the General Assembly. Our function is to interpret the law, it is not
to disregard the law as written by the General Assembly.

